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Foreword
The purpose of PPNN Issue Reviews is to highlight and
analyze issues within the general area of nuclear
non-proliferation that have special topical relevance.
Contents of PPNN Issue Reviews are the sole responsibility
of their authors.  Their publication does not necessarily
imply agreement with their contents by members of PPNN’s
Core Group collectively or individually, funders, or
members of staff.
Background
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) constitutes the legal cornerstone of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime.  It has three core elements:
commitments by non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) not to
acquire nuclear explosive devices and to implement
measures providing assurance that they are not seeking to do
so; pledges by the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) not to
transfer nuclear explosive devices to any other state, not to
assist NNWS to acquire them, and to pursue negotiations on
nuclear disarmament ‘in good faith’; and assurances that all
states parties will be free to exploit to the full the peaceful
benefits of nuclear energy.  As a consequence, the NPT text
is structured around the existence of two classes of states:
NWS (defined as those states which had exploded a nuclear
device prior to 1 January 1967) and NNWS, each of which
has differing commitments under the Treaty.
The essence of the political bargain implicit in the Treaty,
and thus also underpinning the regime, is that the
international norm should be one of no state possessing
nuclear weapons, as they are intrinsically unacceptable to
the international community; the five states with declared
stockpiles of nuclear weapons committing themselves to
seek to dispose of them; and a distinction being drawn
between a programme to produce nuclear explosive devices
and other, acceptable and peaceful, nuclear energy
activities.
The NPT has no secretariat.  Implementation of its
verification regime is the responsibility of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).   The Treaty text was
deposited with the three states with major nuclear-weapon
stockpiles at the time of its signature, the United Kingdom,
United States and the USSR [now the Russian Federation],
rather than the United Nations.  The text did, however,
provide for a conference of the parties to be held every five
years to review its implementation, with the UN being asked
to provide facilities and secretariat services for it.
The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference
The NPT text delayed a decision on the duration of the
Treaty for 25 years, at which point it mandated that a
conference should be convened on whether to make it
permanent, or to extend its duration for one or more fixed
periods.  As a consequence, a combined Review and
Extension Conference for the Treaty was held from 18 April
to 12 May 1995 in New York.  In the course of it, some
states parties argued, inter alia, for the Treaty to be extended
for fixed periods, as this was believed to offer opportunities
for political leverage to be applied to the NWS over nuclear
disarmament, while others asserted that its role as the
cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and in
enhancing global security made it essential that it should be
made permanent.  The task that thus confronted the
President of the 1995 Conference, and those he consulted,
was how to produce a compromise ‘package’ which offered
benefits for all parties such that none would choose to
overtly oppose it.
The package that eventually emerged comprised three
‘decisions’, plus a resolution whose relationship to the main
package is the subject of differing interpretations.  One of
the decisions made the Treaty permanent by recognising that
‘a majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its
indefinite extension’;1 reaffirmed the existing de facto
arrangements for the process of reviewing the
implementation of the Treaty; and ‘emphasising’ in that
context the other two decisions on Strengthening the Review
Process of the Treaty2 and on Principles and Objectives for
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.3  Many states
parties view this arrangement as generating a strong political
link between the three decisions.  Some, particularly those
in the Arab League, view the consensus Resolution on the
Middle East,4 passed after the package of three decisions
had been adopted, as having a similar political relationship
to the extension decision as the other two.
The text of the NPT says little about the process for
reviewing the operations of the Treaty, other than that a
conference could be held every five years ‘with a view to
assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the
provisions of the Treaty are being realised’.  It left states
parties attending such conferences to decide how that
process was to be organised and operated.  The other two
decisions taken in 1995 at the same time as that on the
duration of the Treaty sought to change some of these
arrangements.  They were complementary in nature, as one
sought to create the conditions for a revised process for
reviewing the implementation of the Treaty, while the
second could be viewed as a tool to assist in that process.
Strengthening the Review Process made it mandatory, rather
than optional, to hold review conferences every five years.
Starting in 1997, they were to be preceded by annual
sessions of their Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in the
three years prior to a conference, with the possibility of
holding a fourth in the year that it was to be held.  Each
PrepCom session would normally last ten working days.
These PrepCom sessions were to consider:
principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full
implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to
make recommendations thereon to the review conference.
These include those identified in the Decision on Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,
adopted on 11 May 1995.5
Review Conferences themselves were instructed by the
document to:
look forward as well as back.  They were to evaluate the results
of the period they are reviewing ... and identify the areas in
which, and the means through which, further progress should be
sought ... .  [They] should also address specifically what might
be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to
achieve its universality.6
In addition:
subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective
Main Committees [of a Review Conference] for specific issues
relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide a focused consideration
of such issues.
This implied, inter alia, that discussions in such
Conferences would continue to be organised around their
traditional structure of three Main Committees.
The decision on Principles and Objectives has been
variously described as providing a set of yardsticks for
evaluating the implementation of the Treaty in 2000, a set of
targets to be achieved by 2000, and a contemporary
commentary on how the commitments contained in the NPT
should be interpreted.  It divides the subject matter of the
contemporary NPT process into seven distinct sections:
Universality, Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Disarmament,
Nuclear-weapon-free zones, Security Assurances,
Safeguards and Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, rather than
the traditional clustering of subjects under Main
Committees headings used in past review conferences.  Its
content may be divided into general principles, which are
timeless, and detailed objectives, some of which are
expected to be attained within a specified period of time.  Its
existence highlighted the fact that while consensus,
traditionally sought through the Final Declaration of a
review conference, might be achievable on short, forward
looking documents, it was much more difficult to obtain it
for a lengthy, backward looking one, the latter tending to
place emphasis on the lack of commitment and movement
towards disarmament by the NWS.  Moreover, the existence
of these short-term objectives suggested that at least part of
the 1995 Principles and Objectives document would
become obsolete by 2000, and raised the obvious question of
whether one element of the strengthened review process
should be the generation of new objectives of this type for
each of the five-year periods after that date.
The Strengthened Review Process: Conceptual
and Strategic Ambiguities
Introduction
In the five review conferences that took place between 1975
and 1995 two sets of basic differences emerged in the way
states parties to the NPT conceived of its review process.
One was that some states parties regarded it as essentially a
means of pursuing the total elimination of nuclear weapons,
with the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear explosive
devices as a collateral measure to achieve this end.  Others
viewed it as a mechanism for strengthening the nuclear
non-proliferation regime, and regarded this as an objective
that it was useful to pursue in its own right, and one that
should not necessarily be subordinated to the achievement
of nuclear disarmament commitments.  A second set of
differences was that some states parties argued that all of
them should have the right to acquire and use whatever
nuclear technology they judged appropriate, while others
regarded it as the duty of states capable of supplying nuclear
materials and technology to refuse to agree to such transfers
if they believed there was a possibility of them being used to
assist in the production of nuclear explosive devices.  As a
consequence, discussions among states parties at these
conferences tended to revolve around how to strike a
balance between these dichotomous positions in order to
reach compromises enabling consensus to be achieved on
programmes for future action.
The decision on Strengthening the Review Process did not
resolve these different conceptions, nor did it provide clear
guidance as to how the strengthened review process was to
be put into effect.  Moreover, the decision on Principles and
Objectives contained no indication of their precise roles or
the means of implementing them. Consequently, new areas
of ambiguity relating to the purpose and pursuit of the
review process arose and have become superimposed on the
existing conceptual dichotomies.
These areas of ambiguity related to both the review process
as a whole, and to the work of individual sessions of the
PrepCom.  However, as the PrepCom was given a more
significant and substantive role in the review process in
1995, and as its sessions by definition ‘prepare’ for a review
conference, the burden of resolving these ambiguities has
devolved to them.  What then are these ambiguities?
The Strengthened Review Process
The areas of ambiguity regarding the strengthened review
process as a whole include:
• What should be the relationship between the articles of
the Treaty and the Principles and Objectives?  The Treaty
has legal status, while the Principles and Objectives are
the product of a political agreement.  Yet the latter reflect
the inevitable political, military and technical
developments that have taken place since the Treaty came
into force: should they therefore be regarded as a
contemporary reinterpretation of how the Treaty should
be implemented?
• Whether one of the functions of the strengthened review
process is to prepare for an updating or amendment of the
Principles and Objectives by successive review
conferences, or the creation of a similar, but unique,
forward looking document setting out objectives for
implementation in the five year periods following each
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conference?  The Principles and Objectives document of
1995 represented a new departure, in that it placed great
emphasis on setting targets for states to achieve by the
next review conference.  Are future review conferences
to produce a similar, forward looking document?
• If future review conferences are to seek to produce such
an Objectives document, however, what will its
relationship be to the traditional product of an NPT
review conference, its final declaration?  Should any
‘rolling text’ that emerges from the preparatory process
be a set of Principles and Objectives relevant to this
future period, or a document which will feed into a
lengthy review conference final declaration; or an
amalgam of both?
• What should be the relationship between the strengthened
review process of the NPT, including the programme of
action on disarmament contained in the Principles and
Objectives, and other disarmament forums.
Strengthening the Review Process mentions the
formation of subsidiary bodies of review conferences to
focus on specific issues.  It also mandated the PrepComs
to discuss ‘ways in order to promote the full
implementation of the Treaty’.  Representatives of some
states parties have therefore argued that this gives them
the scope to engage in negotiations within an NPT forum
for the creation of agreements which apply only to Treaty
parties.
• How issues can be discussed and examined in a balanced
way.  In other words, should the same amount of time be
allocated to each issue, or should time be allocated to
issues in accordance with the significance with which
they are regarded; and if the latter, how is this
significance to be determined?  This issue relates to the
structuring of the review process debates: whether they
should be based on the clusters that have shaped review
conferences in the past; or whether they should be based
on the Treaty articles and/or the Principles and
Objectives subheadings.  If the debate is based on
clusters, and each cluster is given equal time, then nuclear
disarmament arguably could receive less attention than if
issues to be debated were grouped by the latter method.
Further, there is the question of whether individual issues
should be singled out for consideration in special
sessions.
The Work of the PrepCom
Those areas of ambiguity relating specifically to the
PrepCom sessions include:
• Should the PrepCom sessions work towards delivering
agreed recommendations to their review conference, or
should they just provide a forum to discuss issues?
• Should the PrepComs seek to create consensus language
on substantive recommendations, or should they just
make recommendations indicating the areas that should
be addressed by their review conference?  Related to this
is whether the PrepCom sessions should seek to establish
a cumulative process of consensus building in advance of
their review conference?  Some states parties appear to be
uncomfortable with this idea, believing that it could
constrain debate on key issues, and would appear to
prefer the PrepComs to be a series of autonomous annual
‘mini’ review conferences, each addressing all issues, and
in particular debating progress on nuclear disarmament in
all its aspects.
• What documentary form should any recommendations
that might emerge from the PrepComs take, and how
should they be generated?  Will any documentation
contain specific objectives for the parties to strive to
achieve in the five-year period following a review
conference; or should such a document be drafted only at
that conference.
The outcome of the 1997 PrepCom clarified some of these
issues and highlighted other conceptual issues that need to
be resolved.
The 1997 PrepCom: Concepts, Process and
Outcome
In the period before the first session of the PrepCom for the
2000 NPT Review Conference in April 1997, considerable
discussion took place on how some of the ambiguities
outlined above might be resolved, including how the more
‘focused’ discussion of substantive issues was to be
achieved; how a balance was to be struck between looking
forward and looking back; and whether substantive
discussions in the PrepCom were to be structured and
scheduled around the items allocated to the three Main
Committees in 1995 or the seven headings contained in the
Principles and Objectives decision document.  As a
consequence, the 1997 PrepCom session was relatively
non-confrontational, and did take steps to implement a
qualitatively different review process focused upon
substance.  The majority of states parties, however, found
themselves in uncharted territory, and took a rather cautious
and tentative approach to the session.
Following extensive prior consultations by the proposed
Chairman — nominated by the Western European and
Others caucus grouping (WEOG) — of the 1997 session of
the PrepCom, the session was initiated by a short, general
plenary debate, after which the parties engaged in the
discussion of three ‘sets of issues (clusters)’, which bore a
very close resemblance to the items covered by the 1995
Main Committees.  Cluster One dealt generally with
security and disarmament issues, Cluster Two with
nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and safeguards and
Cluster Three with peaceful uses of atomic energy.  Equal
time was allocated for the discussion of issues within each of
these clusters.  States parties circulated several conference
papers containing ideas on recommendations that might be
made to the Review Conference in 2000.  Some states
parties were not happy with the Cluster approach but, given
the absence of an obvious alternative which would generate
overwhelming support, they acquiesced as opposing it
seemed likely to lead to unproductive procedural wrangling
which would limit the time available for substantive
discussion.
At the same time, an agreed basis was established in other
areas for the work of the 1997 and subsequent PrepComs
without any procedural matters developing into major issues
of contention.  An understanding was reached that a
representative of the Eastern caucus group would chair the
1998 PrepCom, and one from the Non Aligned group
(NAM) the 1999 one.  The latter would also provide the
President for the 2000 Review Conference.  Dates and
venues for the 1998 and 1999 PrepCom sessions and the
2000 Conference were provisionally identified:7 one
implication of this was to make a final PrepCom session in
2000 unlikely.
An agenda for the PrepCom, covering all its sessions, was
also agreed, with item 4 covering substantive preparations
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for the 2000 Review Conference.  This was formulated to
reflect the fact that the function of the strengthened process
was to review the implementation of the Treaty in
accordance with its Article VIII; that the work of the
PrepCom was to be preparatory in nature; and that it was to
take into account the decisions and resolution agreed in
1995.  It was accepted that every effort would be made to
take decisions by consensus, and if this failed the rules of the
1995 conference would apply.  It was also agreed to alter the
previous arrangements for the participation of NGOs, and
allow them to make presentations to the PrepCom.
However, they were not allowed to be present at all its
formal meetings, only the plenaries.  Finally, summary
records were to be made of the opening and closing
meetings of each session, and the initial general debate.
As it had been accepted that the chairmanship of the
PrepCom sessions would rotate between the three caucus
groupings, and it was to be expected also that the
composition of national delegations would change
significantly in the three year period from the first PrepCom
session in April 1997 to the Review Conference in April
2000, the chairman of the 1997 session was faced with the
task of devising a procedure for handling these issues which
would minimise the effects of the lack of continuity of
personnel that is inherent in the strengthened review
process.  This had two elements: the creation of an informal
consultative group involving most of the active states parties
at the session, including the chairs of the three caucus
groupings; and the production of a document by that session.
Some 20–25 delegations participated in the Chairman’s
consultations, which were very informal and facilitated a
more frank and open atmosphere than existed in the formal
discussions on the Issue Clusters.  The latter involved the
more traditional stating of well-known national positions,
rather than the accounting for actions (or lack of them),
dynamic dialogue and vigorous question and answer
sessions between representatives of states parties that some
participants had hoped to see.  These consultations
concentrated on two issues: possible recommendations by
the 1997 PrepCom to that in 1998 and building-up
recommendations for the 2000 Review Conference.  The
results were contained in a Chairman’s Paper, which at a late
stage in the proceedings was retitled the Chairman’s
Working Paper.
The visible outcome of the 1997 PrepCom was a document8
containing four elements:
• a report on substantive and procedural issues — ‘the
organisation of the 2000 Review Conference and
recommendations to the 1998 session of the PrepCom’
[pp. 1–9];
• a Chairman’s Statement [p. 10];
• the Summary Records of the First Session of the
PrepCom [Annex I, p. 11 — these were not reproduced in
full in the document];
• a Chairman’s Working Paper [Annex II, pp. 12–44].
The core of the substantive part of the report [paras. 15–17]
indicated that the Chairman’s Working Paper had emerged
from his informal consultative group and contained a
recommendation that in 1998:
the official documents and other proposals submitted by
delegations ... will be taken into account during further work on
draft recommendations to the Review Conference and also the
working paper submitted by the Chairman which will be
interpreted in the light of the official documents and other
proposals made by delegations.
The key elements of the 1997 Chairman’s Working Paper
were paragraphs 3 and 4.  Paragraph 3 indicated areas where
‘general agreement’ existed, ‘pending final agreement on all
draft recommendations at the last session’, and outlined a
possible basis for a document setting out recommendations
to the 2000 Review Conference.  It used the sub-headings of
both the Main Committees and the Principles and
Objectives decision document, and was couched in terms of
‘Reaffirmation’, ‘Recognition’ and ‘Welcome’ of issues.  It
thus offered a preview of the areas in which substantive
recommendations might be made to the Review Conference
and the nature of such recommendation, as well as of the
role that the Principles and Objectives decision document
might play in shaping the substantive outcome of the
strengthened review process.  Paragraph 4 listed the many
proposals which had been made by states parties during the
course of the 1997 PrepCom, again classified by the
sub-headings of the Main Committees and the Principles
and Objectives document.
The Chairman’s Statement dealt with the consequences of a
desire on the part of some delegations to give specific
attention and allocate more time to discussion of certain
issues.  It recorded an understanding that:
within the existing agenda and in accordance with the methods
of work adopted at the first session, ... time should be allocated
at the second session for the discussion on and consideration of
any proposals [authors italics] in the following subject areas,
without prejudice to the importance of other issues:
— Security assurances for the parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
— The resolution on the Middle East;
— The provision in Paragraph 4 (b) of the principles and
objectives on a non-discriminatory and universally
applicable convention banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.
It also noted that:
there was no objection to ... making this statement.
The implication of this Chairman’s Statement is that the
1997 PrepCom has recommended to its 1998 successor that
the schedule used in 1997 should be amended to allow
specific time for discussion of proposals on each of these
issues.  However, the wrangling over this statement in the
final hours of the 1997 PrepCom indicated that not all
delegations were happy with this recommendation.  In
particular, one delegation indicated its disagreement with
using the Chairman’s Working Paper alone as the basis for
further work, and to the singling out of the issues in the
Chairman’s statement, as this appeared to give them a higher
priority for discussion than nuclear disarmament.  In making
its statement on this matter, which is contained in the
relevant element of the summary records, it appeared to
signal both a desire to see the 1998 PrepCom repeat the
format of the 1997 one, and the existence of a potentially
divisive procedural issue that the 1998 session might have to
resolve before it could proceed: whether the discussion of
the three named issues should be scheduled as part of the
three cluster discussions, or in addition to them.
One motivation attributed to this position was disquiet at the
prospect of the PrepCom committing itself to far-reaching
and limiting understandings about the substance of its
recommendations at an early stage in its deliberations.  This
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was a reflection of a more general concern held by some
delegations that moving ahead with a cumulative process
would constrain their ability to inject proposals into the
review process immediately before and during the Review
Conference, and more general uncertainties over how the
strengthened review process was to operate; what actions
they might be required to undertake within it; and the
preparations they should make for it.
The effect of revisions to the documentation made in the
final hours of the 1997 PrepCom was to confirm that all
proposals made by states parties would be taken into
account in the future work of the PrepCom, and that all the
preparatory work of the PrepCom was subject to final
agreement on all draft recommendations to the 2000 Review
Conference.  Although some delegations sought to create a
‘rolling text’ in 1997 for transmission to the 1998 session of
the PrepCom, it is difficult to characterise Paragraph 3 of the
Chairman’s Working Paper in these terms, though it does
offer both a structure for the creation of such a text, as well
as an indication of the type of substance it might contain.
The 1998 NPT PrepCom: Questions of Strategy
How is the process of developing recommendations to the
2000 Review Conference going to be advanced at the 1998
session of the PrepCom, in the light of events at its 1997
session?  Although the outcome of the 1997 session was
heavily weighted in the direction of the strengthened process
being a cumulative one, it is not certain that the parties will
choose to build upon the 1997 documentation in their work
in 1998.  They might, indeed, seek to move forward on a
different basis, such as the production of documents
representing the collective views of the caucus groups.  One
obvious way of pursuing the former strategy would be to
take paragraph 3 of the 1997 Chairman’s Working Paper
and seek to add to it additional elements either proposed by
states parties or synthesised from their existing proposals in
paragraph 4.  However, if this were to be done in a formal
context it would probably lead to a focus on drafting rather
than substance, and a ‘rolling text’ full of square brackets.
This suggests that such a strategy might only work if it is
conducted within a Chairman’s consultative group, with
discussion of issues taking place within the more formal
debates.  The latter strategy might become feasible if several
groups of states parties seek to develop their own agreed
documents setting out their positions on all issues covered
by the Principles and Objectives document, and the
chairman of the PrepCom session then attempts to identify
common elements within these documents, and paragraph 3
of the 1997 Chairman’s Working Paper, around which
consensus might be achieved.
As was indicated earlier in this Issue Review, there still
remains considerable uncertainty over the form in which
recommendations are to be transmitted to the Review
Conference in 2000, and what that conference should be
seeking to generate as an output.  This question involves
three distinct issues:
• whether the recommendations should be transmitted as a
collection of individual elements, or as a composite
‘rolling text’;
• whether these recommendations should be regarded as
texts which could be adopted by the 2000 Review
Conference without major discussion or amendment, or
should just be one of a number of inputs into the work of
that Conference; and
• whether the recommendations are to be in a form which
would enable them to be fed into a 2000 version of the
1995 Principles and Objectives document, setting out
objectives to be achieved by 2005, or a 2000 version of a
final declaration arising from the detailed work of the
Conference’s three Main Committees in reviewing the
implementation of the Treaty since 1995, or a document
containing elements of both objective setting and a
review of past performance.
The one area where consensus does appear to be emerging is
that there should be no attempt to ‘amend’ the 1995
Principles and Objectives document.  However, there
remain significant differences between the parties over
whether the output from the conference should be a
consensus document, which would probably be of a
somewhat minimalist nature in key areas in order for
agreement to be reached, or one which recorded the
differences between the parties on those issues, and thus
encouraged a frank debate on them.  What does seem
crucial, however, is that procedures for both transmitting
recommendations to the Review Conference, and for
arriving at outputs from that Conference should be agreed
which allow a core element of the qualitatively different
review process sought in 1995 to be sustained: the creation
of an agreed programme of action for the period 2000–2005.
The issue of the allocation of time between the Issue
Clusters, particularly between Cluster One covering security
and disarmament matters and Clusters Two and Three, and
their use to structure the content and scheduling of
discussions also remains controversial.  In 1997, there were
demands for more time to be scheduled for discussions of
the issues covered by Cluster One, and particularly
disarmament, on the grounds that this would more
accurately reflect the great significance accorded the several
issues covered by this Cluster within the non-proliferation
regime.  The situation in 1998 has been complicated further
by the recommendation from the 1997 PrepCom session that
specific time should be allocated for the discussion of the
three issues identified in the Chairman’s Statement.  This
has led to disagreements over whether this specific time
should be within or outside of the time allocated for
discussion of each of the Issue Clusters, and whether nuclear
disarmament should also be treated in this way.  In addition,
states parties also may face a choice over whether time
allocated to each Issue Cluster should be sub-divided into a
general exchange and a discussion on recommendations to
the next PrepCom and the 2000 Review Conference, or left
undivided.
One final strategy question is what type of document or
documents should the 1998 PrepCom be seeking to produce.
What is the relationship between paragraph 3 and 4 of the
Chairman’s paper and what is their combined relationship to
recommendations for any 2000–2005 version of the
Principles and Objectives document, and/or the Final
Declaration of the 2000 Review Conference?  It is possible
to envisage at least three distinct texts emerging from this
session:
• a document recording the procedural decisions taken in
respect of the 2000 review conference;
• a document synthesising specific national proposals for
recommendations, targets and initiatives written in a
manner such that it would not require a consensus for its
onward transmission to the 1999 PrepCom session [i.e.,
on a some think this, some think that basis];
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• a 2000–2005 version of the 1995 Principles and
Objectives document, almost certainly with another title.
This might be based upon paragraph 3 of the 1997
Chairman’s Working paper
One basic issue illuminated by this series of options is
whether the reviewing of implementation and the setting of
objectives should be integrated in a single document.  The
experience of past attempts by Review Conferences to agree
their Final Declarations by consensus suggests that this may
not be a policy likely to generate a constructive outcome.
Indeed some would see the choice that the NPT review
process now has to make as one between a consensus
document that says little, if anything, and a non-consensus
one that encourages a genuine discussion of the substantive
issues on which states parties held differing views, at the
risk of agreeing a document which publicises those
differences.9
The 1998 NPT PrepCom: Questions of Procedure
Although the 1997 PrepCom session succeeded in resolving
in a quiet and effective manner the procedural issues
necessary for initiating substantive discussions, and thus
launching a ‘qualitatively different review process’, it did so
by leaving to one side several procedural issues that will
need to be resolved either before or at the 2000 Review
Conference.  These included: which NAM nominee will
Chair the Review Conference; Yugoslav representation at
the PrepCom and the Review Conference; the provision of
background documentation for the Review Conference; the
use that will be made of recommendations from the
PrepCom in the Review Conference; the role that the
Principles and Objectives document of 1995, or any
equivalent document that might be sought in 2000, will play
in the Review Conference; and how recommendations are to
be agreed for transmission to the Review Conference —
individually or collectively, by consensus or vote?
While an understanding exists that a NAM representative
will preside over the Review Conference, the other caucus
groups feel that they should retain the right to exercise a veto
over the specific nomination if they regard this as necessary.
Following the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY), a state party to the NPT, several
independent states emerged from it and have acceded to the
Treaty in their own right.  The Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) — formed from Serbia and Montenegro
— has not done so, claiming that it is the continuation state
from the SFRY and, as such, is entitled simply to take over
the seat formerly held by Yugoslavia.  This claim has been
contested by the other newly independent states, along with
other members of the international community, who argue
that the FRY is just one of the successor states and should
accede to the Treaty on that basis.  Thus the issue that arises
is whether any representatives of the FRY should be allowed
to attend the PrepCom.  In 1997 the depositaries of the
Treaty (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the
United States) agreed to seek a solution to this issue in
consultation with other states parties.  They have so far been
unsuccessful.  There exists, therefore, a possibility that this
credentials issue will eat into the time available for
substantive discussions at the 1998 PrepCom session.
Past review conferences have requested from their
secretariats, and those of the IAEA and some NWFZs,
background papers describing those activities relevant to the
implementation of the NPT that have taken place since the
last review conference.  These have in the past been
discussed and agreed by the PrepCom for a review
conference.  This implies that if they are to be
commissioned for 2000 this should be done at the 1998
session in order that they can be agreed at the one in 1999.
The 1998 NPT PrepCom: Issues of Substance
Introduction
As a consequence of the outcome of the 1997 session of the
NPT PrepCom, its 1998 session appears configured to
address three sets of substantive issues:
• How to refine further the draft recommendations
contained in paragraph 3 of the Chairman’s Working
Paper, by integrating into it the substantive proposals
made by parties in 1997 [i.e., in pp. 14–44 of that paper]?
• Whether there are proposals that were not contained in
the Chairman’s Working Paper that should be integrated
into the draft recommendations?
• How to develop proposals on the three issues singled out
for special attention in the Chairman’s Statement:
Security Assurances, the resolution on the Middle East;
and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)?
Refining the Draft Recommendations
Several substantive issues seem likely to generate problems
in refining the understandings inherited from 1997 on a set
of draft recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference.
Egypt and other Arab states will wish to see reference to
Israel and to specific actions in respect of its unsafeguarded
nuclear activities in the section on Universality: the United
States will almost certainly oppose this.  In the section on
Non-Proliferation at least two issues may be contentious:
any reference to Iraq in the context of its non-compliance10
with UN resolutions and interference in the operation of
UNSCOM inspection teams, and the issue of export
controls,11 particularly in relation to Iran.  Under Nuclear
Disarmament, the commitment of all NPT parties to support
the immediate commencement and early conclusion of an
FMCT will no doubt be a subject of considerable debate,12
as will the need to discuss the ‘systematic and progressive
efforts’ that need to be pursued to reduce and ultimately
eliminate nuclear weapons globally, and the need for, and
continuing absence of, any multilateral negotiating mandate
on the elimination of nuclear weapons.  Under
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, states may wish to
recommend that all parties to existing Treaties and their
protocols should sign and ratify them, while it also seems
likely that a recommendation may be sought to urge the
drafting of a treaty covering Central Asia.  Proposals have
already been presented on how to create ‘an internationally
binding instrument’ on Security Assurances, for example the
protocol proposed by Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan at
the 1997 PrepCom meeting,13 while the main issue in
relation to Safeguards may be the degree to which strong
support is given to the proposition that all parties should
adhere to the 93+2 Protocol which extends the scope of
national INFCIRC/153 agreements.  Finally, the application
of export controls, attacks on nuclear facilities and physical
protection of nuclear facilities and materials may also
feature in draft recommendations on Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy.
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Adding Other Proposals
It was always envisaged that additional proposals would be
added as the review process progressed, if only because new
issues would arise over time.  Events of the last year suggest
that the most likely areas for this are in Non-Proliferation
and Nuclear Disarmament.  On non-proliferation, the issue
of the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of
non-nuclear-weapon states and their access to such weapons
might be raised in the context of NATO expansion into
Central Europe.  In the disarmament area, the beginnings of
a debate on the strategies through which nuclear
disarmament might be achieved are emerging, and this may
filter through into the PrepCom debates.14  Events may
create wildcards also, such as transit of nuclear materials or
the consequences of actions taken by states which are
non-parties to the NPT, such as India.
Subjects to be given special attention: Security
Assurances, the Resolution on the Middle East;
and a FMCT
Security Assurances15
One issue that may arise in any debate over proposals in this
area is whether it is appropriate to negotiate on this issue in
an NPT forum, rather than the Conference on Disarmament
(CD).  This is linked to whether such assurances should
apply only to NPT parties, or to all states.  At the current
stage, however, the best that might be hoped for from
discussions on this issue is to try to identify what a ‘legally
binding instrument’ might contain.  One possibility, which
could offer some hope of becoming the basis for an
agreement, would be to translate the existing negative
security assurances already offered unilaterally by four of
the nuclear-weapon states into a legally binding form.  This
might have a series of general provisions, and then a series
of exceptions (e.g., states in alliance with nuclear-weapon
states) and escape clauses (e.g., the agreement ceases to be
operative if a NWS regards itself as being threatened by an
overwhelming non-nuclear threat from another state).
However, such a proposal would raise the question of
whether such an ‘instrument’ would constitute an
amendment to the Treaty and would have to be handled
through its amendment process, a development which many
states oppose in principle.  In addition, the United States
appears implacably opposed to offering global, as against
regional, security assurances, and it appears that unless this
obstacle can be overcome a successful outcome of any
negotiations for a proposal covering all NPT parties is
unlikely.
The Resolution on the Middle East
The central issue here is that all the Arab states are now
parties to the NPT, unlike the situation in 1995, while the
United States seems likely to resist any attempt to name
Israel or to endorse actions against it in the context of the
Middle East and nuclear non-proliferation.  The entry of all
Arab states into the NPT simplifies matters in one respect, as
there is now only one state in the area which is not a party,
and thus any reference to non-parties is unambiguously to
Israel.  However, the disintegration of the peace process in
the area makes the problem more difficult to handle, and
provides evidence that the 1995 resolution has yet to be
implemented.  As the Arab League has been working on a
draft text for a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction
in the Middle East, this may be among the ‘proposals’ that
are offered in the context of this debate.
An FMCT
This was listed in the Disarmament section of the Principles
and Objectives decision document as the second specific
agreement that should be negotiated after a CTBT.  Third on
the list was the more general statement about the NWS
pursuing systematic and progressive disarmament efforts.
In 1997, the CD was unable to open negotiations on a FMCT
because of a linkage made by the Group of 21 to the creation
of an ad hoc committee on disarmament within the CD, and
the refusal of the western NWS, among others, to accept
such a pre-condition for negotiations.  This obstacle still
remains.  As NPT parties are committed to the ‘immediate
commencement and early conclusion’ of a FMCT
negotiation, it is difficult to see at this stage what form
proposals on this matter might take, other than reconfirming
the original commitment to such a negotiation, and offering
ideas for its scope.
The Implication of the 1997 NPT PrepCom for the
Strengthening of the NPT Review Process: Some
Conclusions
From the above, it would appear that three substantive issues
are likely to form the focus of the substantive debates in the
1998 PrepCom: Security Assurances; the resolution on the
Middle East; and Nuclear Disarmament and an FMCT.  The
problem over security assurances is how to develop middle
ground between the United States position that no
unconditional global assurances are possible and that the
way forward is through NWFZs, and the long-held desire of
many non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT for such
legally binding global assurances.  New thinking may be
required on this.  At the same time, this issue may pose a
broader challenge: should such agreements be negotiated
via an NPT meeting or in the CD, and what will be the
consequences for the multilateral disarmament machinery if
it is negotiated in the NPT context.
The resolution on the Middle East poses a rather different
problem, as this has linkages to the 1995 extension decision.
In current circumstances, it is difficult to see how movement
can be generated to assist in its implementation; how the
relationship between the Arab states and the United States
will evolve over the issue; and how far the former will be
prepared to force the issue, in particular by insisting that
Israel should be named in any further resolution or draft
recommendation.  However, this matter goes further than
this, as it is underpinned by a broad set of strategic questions
about how NPT parties should seek to influence the three
key non-parties, India, Israel and Pakistan, to accede to the
Treaty and regime: through coercive tactics or rewards — or
by resolving underlying political disputes and enhancing
regional security.
Finally, progress over nuclear disarmament and an FMCT
appears to be frozen by a dispute over the strategy and
tactics of disarmament — and some basic questions of
national interests.  Nominally, the differences are over
whether to pursue an incremental and loosely directed
strategy to achieve disarmament, or a tightly controlled one,
based on high-level political commitments and a
time-bound framework for action.  They also reflect
uncertainties over the value of an FMCT as both a
disarmament measure and the start of a fissile-material led
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disarmament process, and a certain hostility to the idea that
it is solely a non-proliferation measure.  Yet whatever the
value of seeking to impose one set of truths over another in
this process, one practical consequence has resulted: the
‘immediate commencement and early conclusion’ of a
FMCT has not occurred.  Arguably the gainers in this have
been those against whom such a Treaty is directed —
non-NPT parties and the NWS — rather than the process of
nuclear disarmament or the non-nuclear-weapon states
parties to the NPT.
Underlying these specific differences, however, are the two
extreme views of the strengthened review process that may
be argued to confront NPT parties as they prepare for the
1998 NPT PrepCom.  One is that the strengthened review
process should be a cumulative and forward looking one,
structured around the 1995 Principles and Objectives
document and designed to offer well-developed proposals to
the 2000 Review Conference.  The other is that its exclusive
purpose is to increase the pressure upon the NWS to
negotiate nuclear disarmament agreements, and that the tool
for this is to hold annual ‘mini-review conferences’ with a
standard format and identical agenda in order to focus
attention upon those states’ unsatisfactory disarmament
records.  In practice, of course, the outcome in 1998 may
well be a somewhat unsatisfactory compromise between the
two approaches.
The former option remains a largely untried approach,
whose detailed functioning has yet to be fully worked
through.  However, pursuing the latter option appears to
expose the international community to two dangers: the
probability of sterile, confrontational debates at these
‘mini-review conferences’, and the self-fulfilling prophecy
that the strengthened review process will collapse after 2000
out of frustration with its non-productive nature, and thus
prove to have been a vehicle for smoothing the way to
indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, rather than as a
vehicle for strengthening the regime.  One can only
conclude, therefore, that if the Treaty is to be sustained, the
strengthened review process must be made to work in a
cumulative manner and enabled to produce specific
objectives that states parties should seek to achieve in the
period 2000–2005.  And if agreed recommendations are to
go to the 2000 Review Conference from the 1999 PrepCom
session, the delegates to the 1998 session have little time in
which both to refine the existing draft recommendations to a
point where they are broadly acceptable and identify the key
areas of disagreement that require concerted efforts in 1999.
Parties to the NPT have many common interests and several
conflicting ones.  The common interests focus upon
sustaining the viability of the NPT and its associated regime,
and offering no encouragement to those tempted to ignore
its norms by giving the appearance of a ‘house divided’ and
incapable of acting in an effective, collaborative manner
when confronted by breaches of its rules.  Living in a
nuclear armed crowd is not a prospect that any but a small
minority of states would and should view with equanimity.
Equally, no NWS is likely to disarm in the absence of a
viable non-proliferation regime.  The conflicting interests
arise from the retention of nuclear weapons by five states
and nuclear weapons capabilities by at least three others, and
from issues of regional security and economic development.
The strengthening of the NPT review process should aim to
sustain the common interests of states parties in a
non-confrontational context, thus allowing parties to resolve
their conflicting ones in a constructive cooperative manner.
Only the cumulative process initiated by the decisions at the
1997 PrepCom session appears to offer the prospect of
committing the NWS to a more specific disarmament
programme and serious arms reductions: attempts to coerce
them through confrontation seem highly unlikely to
succeed, and run the risk of sacrificing all that has been
achieved to date in this and other areas of nuclear arms
limitation.
References and Notes
1. It should be noted that this conclusion arose from the existence
of a resolution backing an indefinite extension co-signed by more
parties than were required by the terms of the Treaty to make a
legally binding decision on its duration.
2. NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part  III) , pp. 233–34
[NPT/CONF.1995/L.5].
3. Ibid., pp. 235–38, [NPT/CONF.1995/L.5].
4. Ibid., pp. 243–44 [NPT/CONF.1995/L.8].
5. Para. 4.
6. Para. 7.
7. These were subsequently confirmed.  They are: 27 April to 8 May
1998 in Geneva; 12 to 23 April 1999 in New York; and 24 April
to 19 May 2000 in New York.
8. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.1/32.
9. For a more detailed discussion of some of these issues, see Ben
Sanders, ‘NPT Review Conferences and the Role of Consensus’,
PPNN Issue Review No.4, April 1995.
10. For a discussion on NPT compliance see Lewis Dunn, ‘The
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Issues of Compliance and
Implementation’, PPNN Issue Review No.9, February 1997.
11. See Harald Müller, ‘National and International Export Control
Systems and Supplier States’ Commitment under the NPT’,
PPNN Issue Review No. 8, September 1996.
12. For a discussion of these issues see Harald Müller, ‘A Ban on
Production of Fissile Materials for Weapons Purposes: Doomed
Prospects?’ PPNN Issue Review No.13, April 1998.
13. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/16
14. For a flavour of this debate, see Harald Müller and Makarim
Wibisono, ‘Approaches to Nuclear Disarmament: Two Views’,
PPNN Issue Review No.12, April 1998.
15. For a discussion of the issues surrounding Security Assurances
see George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev, ‘Security Assurances
to Non-Nuclear Weapon States: Possible Options for Change’,
PPNN Issue Review No.7, September 1996.
John Simpson is the Programme Director and Emily Bailey
the Programme Co-ordinator of PPNN.
The Programme for Promoting
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
PPNN Issue Reviews form part of the outreach effort which con-
stitutes a major element of the Programme for Promoting
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN).
Issue Reviews are published on behalf of PPNN by the
Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Department of
Politics, University of Southampton.  Communications relating
to its contents should be addressed to the authors: c/o The
Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of
Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, United Kingdom (Tel:
01703 592522,  Fax: 01703 593533 (international code:
+44/1703), e-mail ppnn@soton.ac.uk.  Other matters should be
addressed to John Simpson at the same address.
Production by Richard Guthrie.  Printed by Autoprint.
© Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation
ISBN: 085432 666 9
PPNN Issue Review Electronic Version 8 April 1998
